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Do Voters Follow? The Effect of Party Cues 
on Public Opinion During a Process of 
Policy Change
Åsta Dyrnes Nordø*
A large body of literature has demonstrated how citizens use party endorsements when shap-
ing their policy opinions. However, recent studies question the centrality of party cues in shap-
ing public opinion. This study advances the literature with a four-wave panel survey design that 
measures citizens’ policy opinions before, during and after a controversial policy proposal to 
ban street begging was made by the Norwegian government in 2014. Two main findings inform 
previous work. First, voters are modestly affected by party cues as the proposition turns salient. 
Second, when a party shifts their policy position on a highly salient issue, voters do not auto-
matically shift their opinions accordingly. Thus, the magnitude and direction of opinion change 
in the electorate indicate that party cue effects are modest and that instead of polarizing pat-
terns across time parallel publics moving in the same direction independent of party cues are 
detected. These findings demonstrate that under some conditions, voters’ opinion formation is 
less dependent on partisan elites than much of the previous work indicates.
Introduction
In democratic theory, the link between the political elite’s policy positions 
and public opinion is a key concern. According to the responsible party 
model of political representation, it is normatively desirable that the opin-
ions of party voters match the political parties’ policy positions (Adams 
et al. 2011). The general conclusion drawn from decades of research into 
the mass–elite policy linkage is that of a reasonably close match between 
parties’ policy positions and voters’ policy opinions. Still, politics is dynamic, 
with parties introducing new policies and changing their policy positions 
in response to external crises, as a response to shifts in the power balance 
within a party, or even strategically, to attract voters or to position themselves 
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towards future cooperation with other parties. A central question in studies 
of democracy is thus how do voters respond to changing behaviour by their 
preferred parties?
One strand of literature studying this mass–elite opinion dynamic investi-
gates party cue effects. Taking as a starting point, the assumption that elites 
play a central role in shaping citizens’ interpretation and formation of policy 
preferences, researchers assume that citizens successfully receive new elite 
information, connect it to their preferred party or candidate position and 
update their own opinions accordingly (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Chong & 
Druckman 2007). This assumption is challenged by two branches of litera-
ture on public opinion conducted mainly in European multi-party systems. 
The first branch of party cue studies argues that the automated processing 
of information assumed within the party cue literature is countered by the 
content of the political information (Aaroe 2012; Boudreau & MacKenzie 
2014; Colombo & Kriesi 2017) and citizens’ political predispositions 
(Togeby 2004; Lenz 2009; Slothuus 2010; Anduiza et al. 2013; Hellwig & 
Kweon 2016). A second branch of studies utilizing party manifestos to iden-
tify policy shifts finds that voters comprehend and react to changes in elite 
policy positions to a limited extent, especially within multi-party systems 
ruling through coalition governments (Adams et al. 2011, 2014; Fortunato 
& Stevenson 2013).
A more recent branch of studies utilizes an innovative analytical strat-
egy studying voter reactions to party policy changes as they unfold in the 
real world based on observational data pre and post change. These quasi- 
experimental studies conclude that citizens do comprehend policy shifts as 
they occur (Plescia & Staniek 2017; Seeberg et al. 2017) and that the policy 
shifts guide opinions (Bisgaard & Slothuus 2018; Satherley et al. 2018).
This study builds on and expands the insights gained from previous 
studies by following Norwegian citizens’ opinions on street begging before, 
during and after a proposal to criminalize this activity is introduced by the 
government in 2014. I study the effects of two instances of party endorse-
ments. First, I investigate the effect of party endorsement on the policy pro-
posal as it changes from a low-salience to a high-salience issue, and second, 
I study the effect of a sudden change in policy endorsement as one political 
party changes their policy position on the same issue. Utilizing a four-wave 
closely spaced panel from a nationally representative survey, I can investi-
gate not only if but also when voters respond to policy cues. And by studying 
a policy process and the position-taking by all parliamentary parties on this 
matter, I can investigate for whom party cues play a role.
This study makes three key contributions. First, I find that party cues 
play a differential and modest role in forming public opinion, depending on 
the party’s position-taking in the policy process. Second, I find support for 
party cues being more likely to affect voters’ opinions if an issue is salient. 
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Third, I demonstrate that in the case of a sudden party policy shift, voters do 
change their opinions to align with the new policy position. Yet, blurring this 
last conclusion is the finding that all voter groups become equally opposed 
to the proposed change in policy in this period. I argue that this uniform 
movement is connected to the characteristics of the public debate leading 
up to the party policy shift.
Accordingly, in the scholarly discussion of the impact of party cues, this 
study takes a middle ground position, pointing out that party cues matter 
among some voter groups and during parts of a policy process, at least in the 
case under investigation here. I arrive at these conclusions through studying 
a policy process as it plays out in a real-world setting, with opinion data col-
lected throughout the process. The study extends previous studies on party 
cue effects of policy change by following an entire policy process from low 
salience to high salience and looking at how public policy support is affected 
both by what parties say and what they do.
Theoretical Expectations: Party Cues and the Role of 
Party Support
A large body of literature on political behaviour has shown that citizens 
use partisanship to filter political information. In a complex world, few 
citizens are motivated or able to learn and remain current on all political 
issues debated in the political arena (e.g., Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). 
Consequently, parties and politicians are influential in shaping public opin-
ion as they supply citizens with their interpretations of politics through cues.
Party cues are inherently connected to partisan bias. In The American 
Voter, Campbell et al. introduces citizens’ party identification as an auto-
mated process: ‘a perceptual screen through which the individual tends 
to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation’ (Campbell et al. 1960, 
133). The effect of such partisan bias on public opinion is consistently con-
firmed in US studies of public opinion (Zaller 1992; Bartels 2002; Chong & 
Druckman 2007). And although the theoretical assumption of automated 
updating processes has been challenged, with some focusing on party cues 
as informational shortcuts (e.g., Chaiken 1980; Kam 2005) and others on 
party cues as facilitating motivated reasoning (e.g., Taber & Lodge 2006; 
Lenz 2009; Slothuus & de Vreese 2010), both accounts suggest that parti-
sans will follow cues from their preferred party and reject or ignore cues 
from opposing party sources, if they receive them. In Zaller’s (1992, 241) 
words: ‘people tend to accept what is congenial to their partisan values and 
to reject what is not.’ Based on this account of partisan information bias, 
citizens should be more inclined to follow a party cue if they receive it and 
if they support the party advertising it.
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Studies of party cue effects within multi-party systems find more inconsis-
tent evidence of this mass–elite linkage. Studying party shifts through party 
manifestos, Adams et al. (2011) find that voters do not systematically notice 
party policy changes (and thus do not update their perceptions accordingly), 
while Plescia and Staniek (2017) find issue importance to regulate voters’ 
attention to manifesto policy changes. Yet, other strands of literature argue 
that although voters may fail to notice party manifesto changes, they are 
sensitive to changing perceptions of parties among party experts and fol-
low their lead (Adams et al. 2014). Moreover, by studying voters’ percep-
tions of party positions from a long-term perspective, the conclusion of both 
European and American studies is that voters tend to pay attention to pol-
icy change and over time alter their perceptions of parties (e.g., Carsey & 
Layman 2006; Adams et al. 2012). In response to the inconclusive findings 
regarding party policy declarations and voters’ perceptions of the same pol-
icy issues, Adams (2012, 413) suggests that voters may not be paying atten-
tion to what parties say, but rather to what they do.
Implicit in the party cue theory is the need for a transmitter of the party 
message to inform and affect partisans. Thus, the media debate is an import-
ant intermediary condition for the transmission of party cue effects. Togeby 
(2004) and Zaller (1992) argue that the more salient the policy issue is in the 
public debate, in the meaning of being written about in the newspapers and 
discussed by the political elite, the more efficiently the parties can transmit 
their policy stance to their voters. Citizens, for their part, are expected to 
respond differently to a changing information environment depending on 
their party preference and whether they are in alignment with their party’s 
platform or not. I hypothesize that if there is a lack of accordance between 
the voters’ attitudes and the party position, voters will change their policy 
opinion to come into alignment with their party, either because they want 
to be aligned with their party or because they trust the opinions of partisan 
experts. Empirically, this should play out as a polarization of opinions across 
groups of party supporters as levels of salience increase.
This study of a policy process to ban street begging demonstrates two 
features that make it particularly well-suited for studying party cue effects. 
First, the case at hand has the crucial feature of being low on the public 
agenda prior to the policy proposal, and second, I have collected opinion 
data on the issue of street begging from a low-salient period and spanning 
the entire policy process. Thus, I can empirically investigate how party cues 
affect citizens across different levels of salience. As most researchers tend to 
study policies that are already salient, the effect of party cues across differ-
ent levels of salience is hardly studied (Druckman & Leeper 2012).
Based on the review of the party cue literature above and the specificities 
of this study I study the effect of party cues focusing both on what parties 
say and what they do through the following two hypotheses:
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H1: The more salient the policy issue to ban street begging, the more likely party supporters 
are to align with their party’s policy position.
H2: When a party shifts their policy position, their party supporters update their policy 
position to align with their party.
Studying Party Cue Effects in a Real-World Setting
I exploit a unique opportunity to study the relative influence of policy en-
dorsements and political predispositions in a real-world political context 
by using representative panel data. Methodologically, this serves as an im-
provement on studies of party cues that have mostly been conducted within 
experimental settings. Experimental studies risk exaggerating party cue ef-
fects; first, by exposing respondents to only one message or way of thinking 
about a policy issue and failing to mirror today’s competitive information 
environments (Sniderman & Theriault 2004; Chong & Druckman 2007; 
Slothuus & de Vreese 2010). And second, by distributing unequivocal policy 
information to all respondents, even those who are not normally exposed 
to political messages are primed. The observational studies of party cue 
effects also suffer from methodological weaknesses, mainly because the cross- 
sectional nature of most data used does not allow for sound causal inference.
To investigate the extent to which voters respond to a policy process in 
a real-world setting, I rely on data collected before, during and after the 
policy process is introduced and becomes a salient topic of public debate. I 
first estimate the extent to which more efficiently communicated party cues 
make voters move towards their preferred party’s position. Second, I focus 
on the two waves bracketing the shift in one party’s policy position related 
to the policy proposal to gauge the extent to which voters update their per-
ceptions and align with their preferred party’s new policy position.
The Policy Proposal to Criminalize Street Begging
Proposals to ban street begging have been the subject of discussion in 
all Scandinavian countries in the last decade (Djuve et al. 2015). In the 
Norwegian context, the issue was raised following the 2013 general election, 
when, after eight years in opposition, the Conservative Party gained power 
together with the Progress Party, which had never been in government pre-
viously. They formed a minority government supported by the Christian 
People’s Party and the Liberal Party. Following the change in government, 
two different proposals for a ban on street begging were considered within 
one year. Both proposals were framed by the government as an instrument 
to combat organized crime, human trafficking and forced labour, relating 
directly to the increase in Roma migrants to Norwegian cities following the 
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2007 eastward EU expansion. The government platform included a change 
in statute, introducing a proposition to ban street begging at the municipal 
level. In July 2014, this bill was passed in parliament with one opposition 
party, the Center Party, securing majority support and a (voluntary) munic-
ipal ban was introduced from 1 July 2014.
The municipal ban was considered a step towards the implementation 
of a national ban on street begging, which had been part of the Progress 
Party’s and the Center Party’s political platforms since 2009. On 22 January 
2015, the government sent out a proposal for a national ban on begging. 
The proposal was two-pronged and included (1) the criminalization of 
organized begging; and (2) the criminalization of citizens1 facilitating such 
activity (Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2015). In the public debate 
that followed, the second aspect of the proposal met a lot of criticism and 
was heavily debated in the media (e.g., Thomas 2014). Specifically, the sec-
ond aspect was understood by many as punishing kind-hearted Norwegians 
who, in solidarity with the beggars, offered them money, shelter and food. 
After two weeks of massive public debate, the Center Party withdrew their 
original support for the proposal on 5 February 2015, and thus the minority 
government no longer had majority support in parliament to pass the pro-
posal to introduce a national ban on street begging. This led the Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security to withdraw the suggestion, and the proposal for 
a national ban on begging never received parliamentary treatment.
The two policy proposals received increased coverage in leading newspa-
pers and national television news across the policy process. Figure 1 shows a 
simple count of the weekly numbers of articles in all Norwegian newspapers 
covering the issue of street begging, conducted by searching the Norwegian 
full-text article database Retriever. The data clearly indicate that there is a 
Figure 1. Media Coverage on the Street Begging Issue and Important Policy Process Events.
Note: Weekly media coverage from 4 November 2013 to 31 March 2015, measured as the number of articles 
published in Norwegian newspapers containing any constellation of the word ‘beg*’. The months indicated 
on the X-axis identify when the four survey panel waves used in the analyses were conducted. Source: The 
Retriever database (www.retri ever.no).
© 2020 The Authors. Scandinavian Political Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf 
of Nordic Political Science Association
Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 44 – No. 1, 2021 51
massive coverage connected both to the ratification of the municipal ban 
on street begging and to the Center Party’s withdrawal of support for a 
national ban on street begging. Based on the media coverage, I argue that 
it is reasonable to assume that there was a gradual increase in the saliency 
of the proposition to criminalize street begging across the policy process. 
Before the policy proposal was launched, there was little focus on the issue 
of criminalizing street begging.2
I argue that the policy proposal to criminalize street begging is a case 
well-suited to studying the effect of party cues on public opinion. First, as the 
review shows, this was a controversial issue that received massive attention 
in the public debate, substantiating party cues to be communicated to the 
public. Moreover, the dynamic of the media coverage moving from low to 
high on the issue of street begging allows us to study party cue effects across 
different levels of the process, possibly adding new insights into the condi-
tioning effects of party cues. Also, the parties’ stance on the issue is simple to 
follow, with all the parties being either for or against a ban on street begging. 
This should provide clear party endorsements to the public. Last, it has the 
unique feature of a party changing its policy stance overnight, thus allowing 
us to study how supporters respond to actual policy change.
Data, Design and Measurement
To connect the development of the proposal to ban street begging with pub-
lic support for this proposal, I utilize closely spaced individual-level data 
collected before, during and after the policy proposal is presented. To my 
advantage, I have been able to collect panel survey data through a univer-
sity-driven online survey panel that consists of a representative sample of 
the Norwegian population.3 The data for this study were collected through 
online interviews conducted twice a year between November 2013 and 
March 2015, spanning the entire policy process and beyond. The panel was 
recruited by postcards based on a random draw of 25,000 inhabitants over 
the age of 18 from the Norwegian National Population Registry during sum-
mer 2013. After the recruitment, respondents were asked to continue their 
participation by providing their e-mail address when they responded to the 
first survey. A total of 4870 respondents entered their e-mail address, equal-
ling a panel recruitment rate of 20.1 percent (Skjervheim & Høgestøl 2013). 
Eight hundred and ninety-two respondents fulfilled all four waves included 
in this study, making up the basis of the analyses.4 The representativity of 
the subsample used is good overall with regards to the variables included 
in the analysis, yet highly educated respondents and the two oldest age co-
horts are overrepresented.5 Descriptive statistics of all variables are found 
in Section 1 of the Supporting information (SI).
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In this study, I follow Bullock (2011, 497) and understand a party cue 
to be information that links a party to a stand on an issue. In my case, that 
issue is the proposal to ban street begging. To test the two hypotheses of 
party cue effects, I ran two sets of analyses. In the first group of models, 
I test H1: whether the voters respond differently to the proposal to ban 
street begging as party cues are more effectively communicated through 
increasing media coverage. The expected mechanism is that voters become 
increasingly aware of their party’s policy position as the proposal is intro-
duced and conveyed to voters through media. Empirically, then, the party 
cue hypothesis is supported through a polarizing pattern across the policy 
process as the supporters of parties supporting a ban and parties opposing a 
ban align with their party’s policy stance. Here, I utilize all four panel waves.
In the second set of analyses, I turn specifically to the policy shift seen 
in the Center Party as they withdraw their support for the proposal to ban 
street begging nationally in the period where the issue was highly salient. I 
use this quasi-experimental setting to study H2: the degree to which party 
supporters respond to party cues understood as actual policy change by 
aligning their own opinions with their preferred party. In this analysis, I 
focus only on the last two waves, as the Center Party policy change hap-
pened five weeks before the last survey wave was fielded, thereby allowing 
for the policy shift to manifest among the party’s voters. Empirically, H2 
is supported if no change in opinion is observed among supporters of the 
proponent parties and Center Party supporters become increasingly more 
opposed to the policy proposal.
In each wave, respondents were asked to state their opinion on the state-
ment ‘Begging should be prohibited in Norway’ along a seven-point bipolar 
Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree.’ This serves 
as the dependent variable, normalized to run from 0 to 1, with 1 representing 
the respondents most supportive of a ban on street begging.
To test the first hypothesis, I include party vote based on which party the 
respondent voted for in the 2013 general election. The party voters have 
been divided into two groups: (1) voters of the three parties (Conservative 
Party, Progress Party, and Center Party) that launched the policy proposal, 
labelled proponent parties’ voters; and (2) voters of the five opposition par-
ties in parliament (Labor Party, Socialist Left Party, Green Party, Liberal 
Party, and Christian Democratic Party) who did not support the proposition, 
labelled opponent parties’ voters.
Party cues have been shown to be more efficiently communicated the 
more salient the policy issue is (Zaller 1992; Togeby 2004). Thus, I measure 
party cue effects indirectly through issue salience, operationalized as media 
coverage. The expectation is that an increase in the coverage of the proposal 
to ban street begging leads to more efficiently communicated party cues 
to its partisans. Based on the timeline of newspaper coverage outlined in 
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Figure 1, I argue that there is a steady increase in the salience of the policy 
issue during the period of study. During the first wave in November 2013, 
the proposal has not yet been introduced and the issue of criminalizing 
street begging is not high on the public agenda. During the spring and sum-
mer of 2014, the proposal to introduce a municipal ban on street begging 
is discussed and passed in parliament, eliciting increased media coverage 
of the issue. I expect this heightened salience to be reflected in the second 
wave in June 2014 but also in the third wave in October 2014. In January 
2015, the issue becomes even more salient as the proposal for a national 
ban on street begging is announced and heavily debated, culminating in the 
Center Party withdrawing their support for the proposal.
To control for possible baseline imbalances between groups, the regres-
sion analyses include issue importance (1 = immigration issue important), 
gender (1 =  female), age (continuous and included as a squared function 
in the analysis), education (1 = no education/elementary school, 2 = upper 
secondary school and 3  =  university/university college) and geographical 
centrality (1 = least central municipalities, to 4 = most central municipali-
ties) in the analyses.6 All control variables are treated as time invariant7 to 
minimize concerns related to reciprocal causation.8
The Effect of Party Cues across the Policy Process to 
Ban Street Begging
The analysis proceeds in three parts. First, I explore descriptively the effect 
of party vote on support for the policy proposal to criminalize street beg-
ging as it is introduced and becomes salient in the public debate. Second, I 
estimate panel models to ensure a robust test of the relationship between 
party support and policy support at the individual level, contingent on in-
creasingly salient party cues. Third, I investigate the effect of actual policy 
change on voters’ policy support, focusing the panel model on Center Party 
voters before and after their party moves from supporting a national ban on 
street begging to opposing it.
The distribution of support for criminalizing street begging seen in 
Table 1 indicates no clear support for H1 of the voters increasingly lean-
ing towards their party’s position as the scope of party cues increases with 
the salience of the policy proposal. Empirically, this would be reflected in a 
polarizing pattern with the proponent parties’ voters leaning more towards 
1 and the opponent parties’ voters leaning more towards 0 as the commu-
nication of party cues increase. First, I identify a large gap in policy support 
across voter groups already from the outset. Still, both groups hold values 
on the upper half of the scale, indicating that the proposal to criminalize 
street begging seems to be in line with most people’s preferences as it is 
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introduced, independent of party allegiance. Second, as the proposition to 
criminalize street begging is introduced and party cues on this issue are more 
efficiently communicated to their voters, I see the expected move towards 
less support for a ban on street begging across the opponent parties’ voters. 
Yet the proponent parties’ voters move in parallel with their opponent par-
ties’ peers, also becoming less supportive of a ban on street begging as the 
proposal is introduced and the issue becomes salient in the public debate. 
Third, the change in support seems to happen gradually over time, although 
the biggest drop in support among both groups of party supporters is seen 
between the two last waves when the policy proposal is highly salient and 
eventually fails.
I move from the inconclusive findings of the descriptive analyses to the 
second and third parts of the analysis, which makes use of dynamic panel 
models called growth models. The model is ‘dynamic’ because it takes into 
account respondents’ different opinions towards street begging at the outset 
and allows them to change opinions at a different pace over time while tak-
ing into account the dependency of repeated observations within individuals.
To test the party cue hypothesis, I estimate growth models where observa-
tions across time are nested within respondents. This makes growth models 
a hierarchical model. I build explanatory models at both levels of the hier-
archy, with the repeated observations measuring change at the individual 
level and the respondent-level factors accounting for differences in opinions 
across respondents. I include random effects at both levels of the hierarchy 
to allow for unexplained random variation to be taken into account (Rabe-
Hesketh & Skrondal 2008). The models are specified using maximum likeli-
hood estimation and standard errors are clustered by respondents in order 
to account for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.
the models compare consecutive waves directly, to most soundly mea-
sure the change in policy support across different levels of salient party cue 
communication. Crucial to testing the two hypotheses in this study, the party 
vote and party cue variables are interacted across waves, which allows the 
two voter groups to respond differently to the policy proposal as the vol-
ume of party cues increases with the salience of the issue and as one party 
changes their policy stance.
Table 2 shows the estimates from the models that utilize all four panel 
waves surrounding the proposition to criminalize street begging. Expanding 
the results from Table 1, the first estimate in the left column points at very 
high overall levels of support for a ban on begging (.92 on a 0 to 1 scale). 
The second estimate identifies that the party vote gap in support of a ban 
on street begging as the issue was of low salience was −.20 on a 0 to 1 scale 
and clearly distinguishable from 0 (p < .001). This replicates the descriptive 
analysis by pointing to exceptionally high levels of public support for a ban 
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on begging, independent of voter groups (.92 for proponent parties’ voters 
and .72 for opponent parties’ voters).
Yet the crucial question is whether the gradual increase in party salience 
connected to the introduction of the proposal – thereby increasing the pool 
of party cues directed at its supporters – leads to a change in support for a 
ban on begging and, importantly, whether this change differs between oppo-
nent parties’ voters and proponent parties’ voters. If it does, this serves to 
support a party cue effect. The third and fourth estimates in the left col-
umn of Table 2 confront this question by comparing opinion change in the 
two lower salience periods. The third estimate tells us that proponent par-
ties’ voters become 0.044 points (on a 0 to 1 scale) less supportive of a ban 
on street begging in this period (p <  .01), while opponent parties’ voters 
become 0.028 points (−0.044 + 0.016) (on a 0 to 1 scale) less supportive of 
a ban on begging (p < .01). Thus, in the low-salience period, I find no sup-
port for systematic differences in opinion change between the two groups of 
party supporters and thus no party cue effect (0.016, p = .27). Consequently, 
the partisan gap in support of a ban is only minimally reduced from −0.20 
to −0.19.
The middle column of Table  2 compares the effect of the two party 
groups before and after the proposal for a local ban on begging is intro-
duced, marking the movement from a mid–low salient to a mid–high salient 
period in terms of media attention. The first two estimates reaffirm the high 
mean level of support for a ban and the big difference in the level of sup-
port between the two party voter groups. In terms of a change in support, 
the small magnitude and statistical insignificance of the third estimate tells 
us that proponent parties’ voters’ opinions are not changed as the policy 
proposal is introduced and ratified (−0.005, p = .66). Moreover, combining 
the third and the fourth estimates, I find that the supporters of the oppo-
nent parties become 0.043 points (−0.005 + −0.038) (on a 0 to 1 scale) less 
supportive of a ban on street begging in this period, and this estimate is 
clearly distinguishable from 0 (p < .001). Thus, as the policy issue of banning 
street begging becomes more salient, the opponent parties’ voters become 
more opposed to the proposal while no reaction is found among the vot-
ers of the proponent parties. Comparing change across groups, I find the 
change among opposition parties’ supporters to be significantly different 
from that of the proposition parties’ voters (−0.038, p < .01), and thus there 
is a modest yet significant increase in the party support gap from 0.19 to 0.22 
(p < .001), supporting H1.
The right column of Table 2 compares the two data waves covering the 
period when the policy proposal was at its most salient, the volume of party 
cues was big and when the Center Party shifted their opinion on the pro-
posed national ban. The two first coefficients restate the high mean level of 
support for a ban on street begging but also show that there is now a wider 
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gap between the two voter groups than there was when the policy issue 
was less salient in the public debate, reflecting the polarization effect iden-
tified in the middle column. Moving on to the interaction effect, both voter 
groups respond to the introduction and debate surrounding the proposal for 
a national ban on street begging by becoming significantly less supportive 
of the proposition. The third estimate confirms the findings of the descrip-
tive analysis, showing that the proponent parties’ supporters become 0.064 
points (on a 0 to 1 scale) less in favour of a ban on street begging between 
the mid–high-salience and the high-salience wave (p <  .001), whereas the 
opponent parties’ voters become even more opposed to a ban on begging, 
shifting their opinions −0.099 points (−0.064 + −0.035, p < .001) (on a scale 
from 0 to 1) in this period. Put together, as party cues are at its strongest, 
party cue effects are evident in the significant difference in magnitude of 
policy opinion change between proponent and opposition parties’ voters 
(−0.035, p < .05), supporting H1. This led to a modest widening of a partisan 
gap from 0.22 to 0.26 (p < .02), driven by the opposition parties’ voters. Yet, 
speaking against H1 is the finding that both groups become more negative 
towards a ban on street begging.
This analysis following a policy proposal through all its stages from intro-
duction to decision and beyond shows that from the outset, even before 
the policy proposal is introduced, the two groups of party supporters dif-
fer distinctly in their level of support for banning street begging, although 
both voter groups supported a ban in the beginning. As the policy process 
unfolds, I find that both voter groups become less supportive of a ban on 
begging. Yet their opinions change at a significantly different pace as the 
policy debate becomes increasingly salient, with opponent parties’ voters 
becoming substantially less supportive of a ban. This difference is reflected 
in a seven percentage point increase in the partisan gap in support across 
the policy process. This finding of a modest polarizing effect is confirmed 
by using different operationalizations and model specifications (see SI 
Sections 5 and 6). Thus, I find modest support for H1, identifying a party 
cue effect among opponent parties’ supporters, but not among proponent 
parties’ supporters.
There are several possible explanations for this weak differentiated pat-
tern. Given the high level of alignment between the proponent parties’ 
voters and the party elite at the outset, the very modest polarizing effect 
may be caused by a ceiling effect among the proponent parties’ voters. SI 
Table S3 further informs this possibility, showing first that the level of sup-
port for a ban on begging differs across supporters of the three proponent 
parties, with the Progress Party voters being most in favour, and second, 
that the Progress Party voters only shift marginally across the policy process, 
whereas the Conservative Party and Center Party voters show more volatile 
opinions towards the policy process as it becomes salient. Thus, Progress 
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Party voters seem mobilized already at the outset. Moreover, SI Figure S2 
shows that the Progress Party and the Center Party are consistently vocal 
in debating street begging in the media throughout the period of study, 
whereas the Conservative Party is less present in the policy debate. This 
may be explained by street begging being viewed as an immigration-related 
issue. With the Progress Party being a nativist party, their voters are primed 
to place themselves on the supportive side of a ban. Thus, I ascribe the pat-
terns of movement among proponent parties’ voters to the different parties’ 
mobilization on the street begging issue at the outset.
The Effect of a Party Policy Shift on Partisan Policy 
Support
As mentioned above, following the entire policy process to criminalize 
street begging allows us to study the effect of party cues under a second, 
and arguably stronger, condition: that of an actual policy shift as the Center 
Party moves from supporting a ban on street begging to opposing it. Based 
on H2, I expect to see increased opposition to street begging among Center 
Party voters and no difference among the other proponent parties’ voters. 
To analyse the effect of party policy change on the Center Party voters, I 
estimate a pre–post panel model that relies on the two last survey waves 
fielded around the sudden change in party cues that Center Party voters 
experience in February 2015. By limiting the analyses to these two waves, 
the number of respondents is considerably larger, adding important power 
to the analysis when modelling change in the small group of Center Party 
voters (71 out of 1986 respondents included in this analysis voted for the 
Center Party in 2013). For this analysis, policy change is a binary indicator 
that takes the value 0 for observations before the party policy shift and 1 
for observations after the Center Party’s policy shift. Center Party voters 
is also a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if a respondent identifies 
as having voted for the Center Party in the 2013 general election and 0 for 
the 2013 voters of the other proponent parties, the Conservative Party and 
the Progress Party. To test the party cue hypothesis that Center Party voters 
should respond to their party’s policy change by becoming less supportive 
of a ban on begging, the policy shift and Center Party voter variables are 
interacted.
Table  3 displays the results. The first estimate shows that before the 
change in policy, there was already a difference across Center Party voters 
and voters for the government parties in terms of their support for a ban on 
begging, with the Center Party voters being 0.098 points (on a 0 to 1 scale) 
less supportive than the voters of the other proponent parties (p <  .001). 
The main interest, however, is in the next two estimates, revealing whether 
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the change among Center Party supporters is any different from the pre–
post change observed among other party voters. The second estimate tells 
us that as the Center Party shifts from supporting the proposal for a national 
ban on street begging to opposing it, the support for a ban decreases by 
0.069 points (on a 0 to 1 scale) among the other proponent parties’ voters 
(p  <  .001). Most important for the party cue hypothesis, the second and 
third estimates combined indicate that Center Party voters also change their 
attitudes in this period, becoming 0.096 points (−0.069 + −0.027) more skep-
tical of a ban on street begging (on a 0 to 1 scale) (p < .001). Yet comparing 
the magnitude of change for Center Party voters and the other proponent 
parties’ voters, the difference in reaction to the policy change seems negligi-
ble (−0.027, p = .414). I also ran the same analysis separating partisan from 
non-partisan Center Party voters, yet no difference in effect is found (see SI 
Table S10).
Still, looking at the direction of the effect, the Center Party vot-
ers do become significantly less supportive of a ban, as proposed by H2. 
Interestingly, the lack of a significantly different pattern of change across 
voter groups seems to be driven by the finding that voters of the other two 
proponent parties become equally less supportive of a ban on begging in 
this period, as already identified in the previous analyses. I find it likely that 
this finding, resembling Page and Shapiro’s theory of parallel publics (1992), 
is related to the heated public debate challenging the policy proposal for a 
national ban on street begging. I discuss this argument further in the con-
cluding section.
Discussion and Implications
To further understand how party cues shape public opinion in a real-world 
setting, this study has examined a policy proposal to criminalize street beg-
ging that was high on the political agenda in the Norwegian public debate in 
2014 and 2015. The results indicate that although parties play a role in shap-
ing citizens’ opinions, they face considerable constraints, speaking to a more 
moderate role for party cues in explaining citizen opinion change when 
compared to the findings in much of the previous literature (e.g., Zaller 
1992; Chong & Druckman 2007; Seeberg et al. 2017). Testing two different 
hypotheses on party cue effects, I first find modest evidence for H1 stating 
that party cues are more influential among salient policy issues, adhering to 
the argument set out by Togeby (2004). Second, I find some support for a 
differentiated role of party cues, shown through a modest polarizing effect 
across the policy process, driven by the voters of the opposition parties. That 
said, the parallel movement found between voter segments clearly chal-
lenges the conventional party cue expectation of a polarizing effect across 
voter segments as they align with their preferred party’s policy position. 
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Third, the quasi-experimental analysis of a sudden change in the policy po-
sition for the Center Party concludes in a similar vein, identifying parallel 
movement in policy opinions across voters of the Center Party, now oppos-
ing the ban, and the government parties, still supporting a ban, thus offering 
only partly support for H2. Rather than resonating with the conventional 
work on party cues, this finding speaks to a literature on parallel publics, 
first laid out by Page and Shapiro (1992). I return to this issue below. To sum 
up, this study indicates modest support for the expectation of an effect of 
party cues on policy attitude change in contrast to what much of the party 
cue literature argues.
To reach this conclusion, I relied on a four-wave panel survey allowing 
the effects of the policy process to manifest in the electorate while simulta-
neously preventing other events or actions from confounding the relation-
ship of interest. This allows for better external validity as party cue effects 
are studied in a real-world setting. Despite its analytical strengths, this study 
has some limitations. Arguably, the fact that I measure party cues only indi-
rectly may affect the conclusions I draw. I do not know when each respon-
dent is informed about their party’s policy position. Rather, I project that 
the salience of the policy proposal on street begging regulates the volume 
of party cues reported in the media. Figure S2 in the SI indicates that this 
assumption may not apply equally across parties. I see that the Progress 
Party and the Center Party dominate the media debate, substantiating the 
argument that some party supporters are more likely to receive party cues 
Table 3. Change in Center Party Voters’ Support for Banning Street Begging Pre and Post 
Party Policy Shift
Support for a ban on street begging












Note: Entries are OLS coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses are based on a 
linear mixed-effects model fitted for the two waves before and after the change in party cues 
for Center Party voters. Full models are found in the Supplementary information (SI). The 
models are run on a balanced panel, and controls for issue importance, gender, education, age 
(sq.) and geographical centrality were included. Proportional weights are applied.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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than others. The media analysis further informs these findings by pointing 
out that the most stable group of proponent parties’ voters, the Progress 
Party voters, has the most vocal party elite while the opponent parties with 
the most volatile voters are less prominent in the public debate.
I argue that the party’s prominence in the media on an issue reflects the 
significance that the party places on that policy. The Progress Party and the 
Center Party both consider immigration a core issue, and as street begging 
today is considered a consequence of migration, these parties are known 
for loudly asserting their opinions on the subject. For the opposition par-
ties, and especially the leftist parties, street begging is arguably a hard issue 
through which to attract voters, thus they seem to keep a low profile in the 
debate until it becomes very salient. Consequently, the relationship between 
opposition parties and their voters’ policy views is more fortuitous than is 
the situation for the proponent parties and their voters. In sum, there is 
some supportive evidence to show that the effect of party cues on opinion 
change is moderated by the significance placed by a party on the issue at 
hand.
As the magnitude of studies of partisan bias indicate, there are strong 
reasons to believe that group preferences differ and shift differently over 
time. As policy moves in conservative direction, as is the case for the street 
begging policy proposal, I would expect polarization across partisan lines. 
Yet, this study connects to an emerging group of studies, consisting mainly 
of US studies, showing that such heterogeneity is not pervasive. According 
to this literature, over-time similarity, labelled ‘parallel publics’ appears 
to be the norm, especially for issues of economy and welfare (e.g., Page 
& Shapiro 1992; Enns & Wlezien 2011). The mechanism for this parallel 
shift in opinion is that different social groups similarly interpret the politi-
cal signs and stimuli that they receive from the outside. This speaks well to 
the findings of the first analysis signifying that although proponent parties’ 
voters move more, both partisan groups become more negative towards a 
ban on street begging across time. Moreover, it speaks to the second analysis 
finding that despite the Center Party changing their behaviour by deciding 
to oppose the proposal that they had previously supported, the Center Party 
voters became no more opposed to the policy proposal than supporters of 
the other proponent parties that did not change their mind.
All this seems to suggest that opinions shift in the same direction because 
they respond to the same contextual information. That said, this study does 
not enable us to conclude that opinions shift in the same direction for the 
same reasons. With regard to the analysis of the Center Party’s sudden shift 
it is plausible that Center Party supporters respond to their party changing 
their policy position while the other proponent parties’ voters may respond 
to the intense public debate following the announcement of a national ban 
on street begging which focused on humanitarianism and on solidarity. The 
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design used here does not allow me to successfully separate these two causal 
mechanisms that may be at play here. To unveil the substantial content 
that guide the shift an experimental approach or a more qualitative design 
would be beneficial. That said, the finding of parallel publics in a European 
setting with stronger ideological orientation and on an arising polarizing 
cleavage like immigration adds leverage to the literature. Moreover, the fact 
that parallel publics is identified in individual-level analyses on short-term 
opinion change is an innovation that potentially expands the application of 
the theory of parallel publics into a new domain. Still, more studies using 
an individual-level approach to study public opinion change is needed to 
realize this contribution. On its own, this study has limited generalizability. 
Yet, seen in connection with the studies above focusing on issue areas of 
both welfare and the economy, my study of an immigration-related policy 
change adds another important issue area to the pile of empirics that show 
the moderate importance of party cues in affecting voters position-taking.
The system of democratic decision-making hinges on the premise that 
people do not uncritically follow elite manipulations but take informa-
tion and their own considerations into account. In reference to multi-party 
democracies like Norway, Bullock (2011) and Adams (2012) argue that pol-
icy considerations should be relatively more influential there, as party elites 
exert less influence on people than what the classical studies (based in large 
part on the US context) acknowledge. The case of street begging supports 
this view by highlighting that there is some support for party cue effects 
influencing opposition party voters as the policy issue turns salient, the pat-
tern of parallel shifts in opinion across the partisan spectrum indicates that 
political elites may face constraints on their abilities to shift citizens into 
alignment with the party view. In relation to the party cues literature, expect-
ing a processing of information in favour of citizens’ preferred parties, these 
findings are bad news. However, in relation to democratic decision-making 
ideals where, the finding of parallel publics that respond equally to the same 
contextual information may be good news.
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NOTES
 1. Humanitarian and other voluntary organizations providing beggars with clothes, food 
and shelter were exempt from this proposal.
 2. The exception was a campaign initiated by the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten in 
summer 2012, focusing on Roma migrants occupying and littering parts of a recreational 
area in Oslo.
 3. The data used for this article are available upon request from the Norwegian Center for 
Research Data http://www.nsd.uib.no/nsdda ta/serie r/norsk_medbo rgerp anel_eng.html.
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 4. By basing the analyses on a balanced panel I minimize the methodological concerns re-
lated to missing data that cannot be ignored (Singer & Willett 2003), assuming that the 
data is MCAR. This means that the observed values should constitute a random sample 
of all observed variables given there are no missing data (Singer & Willett 2003, 157).
 5. For a more thorough analysis of the representativity of the samples used in this article, 
please confer Section 2 of the Supporting information (SI).
 6. Due to missing data on the education variable, the number of units is slightly reduced 
from the descriptive analysis
 7. This means that all variables are based on values from the respondents’ first wave of 
participation.
 8. The danger of reciprocal effects is potentially high in the study of party cues, as parties 
are likely to attract and repel different voters depending on their message.
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